The Asian Crisis and its Impact on the Brazilian Markets





SUMMARY :
Chronology of the crisis
Behaviour of stock, money and foreign exchange markets during the crisis
Regulatory measures: circuit-breaker début
The impact on the futures industry


Complet Article for Download








Próxima Página
Índice

Chronology of the crisis

The unfolding of the Asian crisis
In the complex framework of the 1997 financial crisis in southeast Asia, two events stand out. The first one is the abandonment by Thailand of the fixed exhange rate system in the middle of July. It was the start of a chain reaction in which half a dozen other economies of the region suffered speculative attacks and had their currencies devalued. As a result, stock markets fell as local companies’ debts and profit forecasts were reviewed under the new exchange rate régimes.
The second event was the Hong Kong stock market crash, at the end of October. Although part of the same process, the crash and its contagion effect on markets all over the world ended for good all hopes that the crisis could be circumscribed on a local level. In European and North American economies, in Latin America and the whole of Asia, stock markets endured heavy losses. No country was immune to what is now known as the first financial crisis of global capitalism.
This Report details the impact of the crisis on the financial markets in Brazil, emphasizing the stock and futures markets and the regulatory responses by governmental and market authorities.

The crisis reaches Brazil
Brazilian stock markets enjoyed an upward trend during the whole first semester of 1997. From January 1st to July 8th, when it reached its annual high, the Ibovespa, the Brazilian main market index, rose from 7,040 points to 13,617, a spectacular rise of 93.4% (see Graph 1 below). This impetus was mostly fueled by the perceived strengths of Brazilian stabilization plan along with an  aggressive privatization programme, including the state telecommunications system Telebrás, whose shares account for well over half of the daily trading volume in Brazilian markets.
 

July 15th marked the opening of a new, and grimmer, period. In Asia, a currency crisis began. First Thailand abandoned the fixed exchange rate system against the US dollar and the baht quickly fell more than 20%. Other economies of the region followed close behind, all their currencies uffering abrupt devaluations during the next few days. The contagion effect reached Brazil immediately. After two daily falls of more than 3% (11-07-97 and 14-07-97), Ibovespa plunged 8.5% on Tuesday, July 15th. The average volatility increased almost threefold from 24% p.a. (realized from January 1st to July 14th) to 62% p.a. (from July 15th to December 30th). By the end of the week the index had accumulated a 15% loss. As shown in Graph 1, the next seventy days were a period of very high volatility, during which Ibovespa had many up and downturns around the average of roughly 12,000 points. The crash on October 23rd caught most players in the domestic financial institutions off-guard, after some three weeks in which the market gained upward momentum, as fundamental prospects for the Brazilian economy seemed to be improving.
We present next a detailed chronology of the apex of the crisis in Brazil, from October 23rd to November 14th, resulting in a loss of one third of market value.
 
 

October 23rd – 24th

Ibovespa:
-8.2%
-3.0%

Hong Kong Stock Exchange fell more than 10%. In Brazil, trading with Telebrás stocks (the main blue chip) was suspended in the morning because of the official disclosure of its privatization model. As a result, fund managers hedged heavily selling index futures. São Paulo Stock Exchange suffered the second largest loss in world markets. The next day, rumours were heard of an speculative attack on the Venezuelan currency.

October 27th

Ibovespa:
-15.0%

Brazilian markets opened under the influence of another fall in Hong Kong (down 5.8%), echoed in Asian and European markets. In the United States, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) circuit breaker worked twice; by the end of the day the Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen 554 points, its worst result since the crash of 1987. The main Latin American stock exchanges followed the lead: Argentina and Mexico each plunged more than 13%, while the Brazilian Ibovespa suffered its fourth greatest loss ever and the largest in seven years.

October 28th

Ibovespa:
+6.4%

Hong Kong stock exchange closed with a loss of 14%. In Brazil, regulatory countermeasures were agreed upon between the exchanges and the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM). The functioning of the main exchanges (Rio and São Paulo) was synchronized with that of the NYSE, from 12:30 pm to 6:30 pm local time. Also, a circuit-breaker was established for the first time, both in São Paulo Stock Exchange and the Brazilian Futures Exchange (BM&F). When the exchanges opened, Ibovespa fell more than 10% in only four minutes, activating the 1-hour circuit-breaker. The whole day was marked by extreme volatility, with an intraday range of nearly 20%. The pronouncement by the President of the United States temporarily calmed down the markets.

October 29th

Ibovespa:
-6.0%

Rumours of difficulties in the financial sector due to tough margins calls began to spread early in the morning. Another wave of selling was triggered by the liquidity squeeze caused by higher margin calls, mark-to-market of futures contracts and the public withdrawals from equity funds. Adjustments in the regulatory measures were made.

October 30th – 31th

Ibovespa:
-9.8%
+1.5%

After the close of the markets, the Monetary Policy Committee, in an extraordinary meeting, doubled the Central Bank basic interest rate (TBC), in an attempt to stop the capital flight in the forex markets. The decision was interpreted as evidence of the government’s determination to shield the currency and keep speculators at bay. On October 30th, BM&F released a press communiqué saying that all margin requirements and contracts markings-to-market had been met, in volumes amounting to more than US$ 1.8 billion. The communiqué also asserted that there had been no compulsory liquidation of futures contracts and no communication of defaulting clients by brokerage houses.

November 3rd – 6th

Ibovespa:
+9.7%
+4.0%
-2.6%
-5.5%

The rise was less a signal of an overall change of scenario than an indication of the persistence of high volatility. BM&F increased the daily trading range of Ibovespa futures contracts from 10% to 15%. Positive determinants included the privatization auction of CPFL (the energy state company of São Paulo) on November 5th, and announced share buybacks by some corporations. CPFL was sold 70% above the minimum price set.

November 7th

Ibovespa:
-6.4%

After dipping more than 10% during the day, Ibovespa closed -6.4%. Late afternoon the circuit-breakers of both Rio and São Paulo stock exchanges were activated, halting trading for 30 minutes. BM&F released another press communiqué, similar in contents to the one of October 31st.

November 10th – 11th

Ibovespa:
+2.0%
-3.3%

Before trading began on Monday, the government announced a set of 51 measures of fiscal policy, aiming at the foreseen increase in public debt due to the interest rate rise.

November 12th

Ibovespa:
-10.2%

World markets were down and the negative flow of Brazilian foreign exchange reserves persisted. Circuit-breakers were activated for the third time since the beginning of the crisis and Ibovespa closed the day with another deep fall. Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange (BVRJ) narrowed the limits of its circuit breaker.

November 13th

Ibovespa:
+3.2%

In a clear reaction to the previous day’s loss, authorities announced a set of concerted measures. CVM raised the maximum limit of share buybacks, while the Central Bank lowered the minimum term for bond issues in foreign markets.

November 14th

Ibovespa:
+8.2%

Many factors concurred to raise the index. Asian markets emitted positive signals. Telebrás ADRs were high in the OTC New York market. Bargain hunters began to prey for cheap stocks in Brazilian exchanges. At the end of the day, BM&F released a third communiqué not different from the previous ones, indicating no liquidation stress in the futures markets. Still on that day, the Central Bank disclosed the total loss of foreign currency reserves during the last week of October: US$ 8.3 billion.

 
Próxima Página
Índice



Fale com a CVM